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Abstract. This paper reports on higher-order square analysis of the
AES cipher. We present experimental results of attack simulations on
mini-AES versions with word sizes of 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 bits and describe
the propagation of higher-order Λ-sets inside some of these distinguishers.
A possible explanation of the length of the square distinguishers uses the
concept of higher-order derivatives of discrete mappings.
1 Introduction
This paper describes experimental results of higher-order square attacks [6, 11,
14] applied to scaled-down or mini-versions of the AES cipher. We detail the
internal structures (patterns) of square distinguishers but do not apply them
to key-recovery attacks. Although this process is straightforward, our aim is to
determine how many rounds these distinguishers can cover without exhausting
the codebook.
Scaling can be done either upwards or downwards. In our context, scaling
means shrinking or enlarging each internal cipher component accordingly, re-
sulting in a mini-version or a super-version of the original cipher, operating
on smaller or larger blocks of data, respectively. Thus, scaling does not mean
changing the number of rounds, and therefore, it should not be misunderstood
as reduced-round versions of a cipher.
In this paper, our experiments are focused on scaled-down versions only.
Nonetheless, scaling-up is also possible, and is a flexibility of many cryptographic
algorithm usually ignored and neglected by designers. This fact may be due to
increased storage requirements (e.g. for S-boxes) or because of operations involv-
ing words whose size is not a power of 2, which do not fit exactly into the word
size of popular microprocessors, thus leading to inneficient implementations.
The attractiveness of mini-ciphers comes from the fact that they provide a
convenient testbed for new cryptanalytic ideas, and also to obtain experimental
data such as success rate, and to corroborate (or not) theoretical predictions,
because their reduced size lead to smaller attack complexities. Examples of al-
gorithms which have mini-versions analysed include RC4 [12], RadioGatu´n [9],
IDEA [3] and the AES [18, 19, 4, 23].
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Some algorithms such as DES [7], CAST and Serpent are harder to scale
(either up or down) because they contain operations not amenable to scaling
such as bit permutations, bitwise rotation and non-surjective mappings. Thus,
cryptanalysts are left with too many degrees of freedom for choosing the param-
eters and components of mini-versions. In the end, the contrived mini-ciphers
are somehow just ad hoc designs.
On the other hand, there are ciphers with implicit scaled-down versions, such
as IDEA [15] and AES [1], since their design is word-oriented. Thus, scaling is
straightforward, based on a single parameter, the word size. It is notable that
designers rarely provide scaled versions in full detail. One often missing part is
the key schedule algorithm. For example, in IDEA, the bit-rotation operation in
its key schedule is problematic to scale. The choice of the rotation amount may
depend on the design criteria (which is not clear or definitive).
In the most favorable cases, the ciphers are fully parameterized for block,
key and word sizes, such as RC5 and RC6 [21, 22]. It is important to notice that
scaling should be done carefully in order not to affect the overall strength of
the algorithm. Why? Because it is implicitly expected that attack results (and
conclusions about the behaviour of) mini-versions can be extrapolated to the
original algorithm. This assumption is not always justified.
There are limits to the amount of shrinking that can be performed in mini-
cipher designs. For instance, 2-bit S-boxes are linear mappings, and such extreme
cases destroy the main (if not the only) nonlinear component of many ciphers.
Thus, one cannot expect to extend results on such mini-versions to the original
cipher, because the inherent strength of the cipher has been jeopardized.
This paper is organized as follows: Sect.2 describes tentatives of defining
mini-versions of the AES, and its purposes; Sect.3 describes our tentative mini-
versions of AES, and the rationale behind those designs; Sect.4 provides some
background on square attacks and terminology; Sect. 5 discuss the issue of
higher-order derivatives of discrete mappings; Sect. 6 describes distinguishers
obtained experimentally for mini-versions of the AES; Sect. 7 summarizes the
paper.
2 Mini-AESs
Several mini-versions of the AES cipher have already been reported. For instance:
– M. Musa, E. Schaefer, S. Wedig [18]: 4-bit words, GF(2)[x]/(x4 + x + 1),
16-bit block, 2× 2 state, purpose: explain AES operations
– R.C.-W. Phan [19]: 4-bit words, 2×2 state, 16-bit key, GF(2)[x]/(x4+x+1),
purpose: explain AES operations
– C. Cid et al. [4]: mini-versions are denoted SR(n,r,c,e) and SR∗(n,r,c,e), with
n= #rounds, r= #rows, c= #columns, ’e’ is word size, purpose: algebraic
cryptanalysis
– N. Courtois [5]: CTC2, 3-bit words, GF(2)[x]/(x3+x+1), purpose: algebraic
cryptanalysis
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– R.-P. Weinmann [23]: 3-bit words, GF(2)[x]/(x3+x+1), 2×2 state, purpose:
algebraic cryptanalysis
3 Our Own Trial Designs
Mini-ciphers described in the literature, such as the ones listed in Sect. 2, usually
do not provide enough details to allow full implementation. Often, something is
missing such as the key scheduling algorithm. The source code of these mini-
versions, which could clarify these gaps, is almost always absent, too. A reason
might be the purpose of each mini-version. Some of them were designed for
didactic purposes only and never meant to be used in practice. Our aim, though,
is practical experimentation of cryptanalytic attacks.
We have designed mini-versions of AES based only on the word size t in bits,
for 3 ≤ t ≤ 7. Source code in ANSI C of all of these mini-versions of AES is
freely available via the authors or at
http://www.dagstuhl.de/en/program/calendar/semhp/?semnr=09031
Table 1 lists the main parameters of our mini-versions of AES for different
word sizes (denoted t). The t× t S-boxes we used are listed in the appendix. The
finite fields used are GF(2t) = GF(2)[x]/(m(x)), where the irreducible polyno-
mials m(x) are listed in Table 1. These polynomials were chosen at random. The
round operations AKi, SB, SR and MC for the mini-versions are the same as for
the original AES, but on a reduced scale. In particular, for MC, the coefficients of
the MDS matrix are the t least significant bits of the corresponding coefficients
of the original AES MDS matrix. The same approach holds for constants used
in the key schedule. The number of rounds is the same as those used in AES,
even for different key sizes.
Table 1. Parameters of mini-AES ciphers and AES.
t (bits) m(x) State Size Key Sizes
(16t bits) (bits)
3 x3 + x + 1 48 48; 72; 96
4 x4 + x + 1 64 64; 96; 128
5 x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 80 80; 120; 160
6 x6 + x5 + x3 + x2 + 1 96 96; 144; 192
7 x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 112 112; 168; 224
8 x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 128 128; 192; 256
4 Square Attacks
The square attack originated as a dedicated attack on the Square block cipher [6].
This technique has similarities with the multiset attack [2], the saturation attack
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[16] and with integral cryptanalysis [10, 13]. All of these techniques operate in a
chosen-plaintext (CP) setting.
A fundamental concept in a square attack is the Λ-set [6], which is a multiset,
that is, a set with multiplicities, containing b full n-bit text blocks, where n is the
block size and b is typically a power of 2. These n-bit text blocks are analysed
by tracing (not necessarily contiguous) t-bit words, t < n, across the different
round operations. For example,
{(0||1||2||3), (1||2||2||1), (3||1||2||2), (2||2||2||1),
(7||5||2||0), (4||5||2||7), (5||5||2||4), (6||5||2||4)} (1)
is a Λ-set with b = 2t = 8 text blocks, each of which is 12 bits wide (n = 12).
Double vertical bars, ||, mean concatenation. We further consider each of these
2t text blocks as a concatenation of four t-bit words (t = 3), and thus, keep track
of particular patterns in these t-bit words across the 2t text blocks. These t bits
are often composed of contiguous bits that respect word boundaries, hence the
use of the term word. The patterns of interest are the following:
– if the t-bit word in a Λ-set assumes each of the values 0 to 2t − 1 exactly
once, then the word contains a permutation and is called an active word,
denoted ’A’. This is the case of the word formed by the first 3-bit word of
each element in the multiset (1), which is {0, 1, 3, 2, 7, 4, 5, 6};
– if the t-bit word assumes an arbitrary constant value, it is called passive
and is denoted ’P’. This is the case of the third set of three bits in (1),
{2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2};
– if the t-bit word contains an even number of repetitions of some arbi-
trary values (each element has even multiplicity), the word is called even,
and is denoted ’E’. This is the case of the second set of three bits in (1),
{1, 2, 1, 2, 5, 5, 5, 5};
– if the sum of all t-bit values in a given word under some operator ⊡, results
in a predictable amount, then this word is called balanced, and denoted ’B’;
– otherwise, if the ⊡-sum results in an unpredictable value, the word is de-
noted ’?’. This is the case of the fourth set of three bits in (1), which is
{3, 1, 2, 1, 0, 7, 4, 4}, with ⊡ = ⊕ that is exclusive-or.
Multiset attacks are aimed at the bijective cipher components. In a sense,
this technique uses permutations (e.g. ’A’ words) to attack other permutations
(e.g. S-boxes). Moreover, ciphers that operate on neatly partitioned words are the
main targets. A typical square attack starts with Λ-sets with a single active word.
After crossing multiple rounds, this ’A’ word progressively looses its internal
patterned structure, degrading into ’E’ words (not permutations anymore), then
’B’ words (not even anymore), and finally ’?’ words (no detectable pattern).
Only the initial (plaintext) can be controlled by an adversary. The propagation
of words across multiple rounds is unconstrained by the adversary. On one hand,
this fact leads to square distinguishers holding with certainty. On the other
hand, it is not yet known how to construct probabilistic nor iterative square
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distinguishers, like differential characteristics (which are typically constructed
by concatenating smaller characteristics).
Square distinguishers can be viewed as exploiting partial functions of the
encryption mapping, since some of the plaintext bits are fixed (to an arbitrary
constant value: ’P’) while other bits are assigned all possible values (’A’).
Since the exclusive-or (⊕) operator is used to combine round subkeys with in-
termediate cipher data, it is natural to use ⊕ = ⊡ as the operator for computing
the sum, because this value becomes independent of the round subkeys (an even
number of plaintexts are added). The expected exclusive-or sum for balanced
words is zero. All multiset attacks reported in the literature have used either the
⊕ or the modular additive sum [10, 20] as the operator in the distinguishers.
The original square attack in [6] has order 1 because it uses one active t-
bit word only (while the remaining t-bit words are passive). Square attacks of
nth-order use n t-bit words (multi-words) at once or a single tn-bit active word,
while the remaining words are passive. The data requirement is proportional to
initial active word size: 2tn chosen plaintexts (CP).
Reasoning about the propagation of different kinds of patterns across each
round transformation is relatively straightforward for 1st-order square distin-
guishers. Higher-order analysis, though, requires us to change focus from a sin-
gle word to several words at once (these multi-words are denoted with ’*’ in
the distinguishers). But, explaining how far such patterns propagate until they
degenerate into ’?’ words requires another mechanism. To explain the length of
higher-order distinguishers we use the concept of higher-order derivatives.
5 Differences and Higher-order Diferences
In [14], Lai related the notion of higher-order differential with that of derivatives
of discrete mappings:
Definition 1. Let (S,+) and (T,+) be Abelian groups. For a function f : S →
T , the derivative of f at the point a ∈ S is defined as
∆af(x) = f(x + a)− f(x),
where −a is inverse of a in T .
The ith-derivative of f at the points a1, . . . , ai is defined as
∆(i)a1,...,aif(x) = ∆ai(∆
(i−1)
a1,...,ai−1
f(x)).
Proposition 1. For a function f : S → T with degree d, the dth-derivative of
f is a constant.
Lemma 1. For a function f : S → T with degree d, the (d + 1)th-derivative of
f is zero.
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For AES and its mini-versions, (S,+) and (T,+) are (GF (2),⊕), and the map-
pings of interest are the S-boxes and in particular the Boolean multivariate map-
pings induced by each S-box output bit. All t × t S-boxes for the mini-versions
under analysis are bijective and consist of the composition of inversion in GF(2t)
followed by an affine transformation, just like the AES S-box. More especifically,
each output bit can be expressed as a multivariate polynomial of degree exactly
t − 1, which is the maximum possible. This choice (and the overall design of
the mini-versions) was intended to preserve the cryptographic strength of the
mini-versions as close as possible to what is expected of block ciphers operating
on 16 · t-bit blocks.
6 Experimental Results
A 1st-order square distinguisher is depicted in (2). It covers 3.25 rounds of AES,
and has the same length for all relevant word sizes, t ≥ 3. The position of
the initial ’A’ word does not change the length of the distinguisher. We count
every round transformation AKi, SB, SR and MC as a 0.25 fraction of a round.
Symbols on top of arrows indicate the round transformations the cipher state
undergoes during encryption. Composition of mappings operate in right-to-left
order.


A P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P


MC◦SR◦SB◦AK0→


A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P


SR◦SB◦AK1→


A P P P
P P P A
P P A P
P A P P


SR◦SB◦AK2◦MC→


A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A


AK3◦MC→


B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B


SB
→


? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

 (2)
Distinguisher (2) has originally been described in [6], and the reasoning for the
propagation of ’A’, ’P’, ’B’ and ’?’ patterns is based on the structure of each
pattern and how they change according to each round transformation.
Another reasoning to explain why (2) reaches only 3.25 rounds and not fur-
ther uses higher-order derivatives. If we consider that a Λ-set contains 2t·o CP,
where o is the order of the square attack then, one can view this Λ-set as a t · o-
th derivative applied to the encryption mapping of a t-bit oriented cipher, with
distinct points of derivation. The degree of each output bit after every round
increases as a power of t−1, because of the SB layer. Thus, after the first round,
all output bits can be represented as multivariate functions of degree t−1. After
two rounds, the output bits can be viewed as multivariate functions of degree
(t − 1)2, because of the second (nested) S-box layer, SB. And so on, up to a
maximum degree of 16 · t because there are at most 16 · t plaintext bits3.
3 The ANF (algebraic normal form) of any monomial can involve at most 16 ·t distinct
variables.
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According to Lemma 1, a Λ-set corresponds to a t · o-th order derivative. If
the derivative has order higher than the degree of the output mappings of the
mini-version (after a certain number of rounds), then the exclusive-or sum, or
the derivative of the mapping, vanishes.
But, there is a twist: if one starts counting the degree of the multivariate
polynomials from the first SB layer, then there is no agreement with the theory
above. For instance, (2) covers 3.25 rounds, which means three SB layers, that is,
the degree of each output bit is 33 = 27, but (2) uses only 24 CP or a 4th-order
derivative, which is not enough for a multivariate polynomial of degree 27 to
vanish. But, if we discard the first two rounds of the distinguisher, then there is
agreement between theory and practice. Why? Notice that the initial ’A’ pattern
is ’preserved’ across the first two SB layers. If we discard these two S-box layers
and start counting the degree from the third SB layer, then the output bits will
have degree t − 1 = 3 which vanish for a 4th-order derivative. For the next SB
layer, the polynomials will have degree (t − 1)2 = 9 which do not vanish for a
4th-order derivative. Thus, the distinguisher cannot cross the fourth SB layer.
The reason to discard the first two S-box layers follows similarly reasoning
to why it makes no sense to use 16th-order Λ-sets: since the encryption function
is a 16 · t-bit permutation mapping, its output will always be a huge (16 · t-bit)
active word, independent of t and for any 16 · t-bit block cipher.
Taking this ad hoc reasoning into account, the theoretical predictions are
corroborated by attack experiments on mini-AES versions and even AES and
Rijndael. Without the concept of higher-order derivatives, the usual explanation
of pattern propagation across higher-order square distinguishers is much harder
to justify. Thus, the derivatives (ignoring the first two rounds) provides a more
consistent explanation for higher-order distinguishers, not only for mini-versions
but also for the original AES.
In general, for an t · o-th order Λ-set, containing 2t·o CP, a o-th order square
distinguisher is expected to reach r rounds (or to cross r SB layers) as long as
the following relation is satisfied
min(16 · t, (t− 1)r−2) < t · o. (3)
It means that, ignoring the first two rounds (r−2), the degree of the multivariate
polynomial of each output bit of every round increases as a power of t − 1 per
S-box layer, until a maximum of 16 · t, because there are at most 16 · t plaintext
bits. A t · o-th derivative can vanish polynomials with degree at most t · o − 1,
according to Lemma1, setting a threshold to the length of the distinguisher.
As a test, the next relevant higher-order distinguisher has order four because
of MC round transformation that combines four words at a time through an MDS
matrix. The corresponding distinguisher is depicted in (4), which starts with a
4 ·t-bit active word split into four pieces denoted A∗. Each of the four t-bit words
of this active multi-word can be seen as ’E’ words (denoted E1, . . ., E4). The
position of the initial four A∗ is not random. The four words are positioned so
as to account for the forthcoming SR transformation and the subsequent MC
layer. Thus, after SR◦SB ◦AK1 ◦MC ◦SR◦SB ◦AK0 or 1.75 rounds, the state
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still contains one 4 · t-bit active word, while the remaining words are passive.
Therefore, the careful choice of the positioning of A∗ helped extend this pattern
across almost two rounds.
Again, computing the degree of Boolean expressions of S-box output bits after
the second SB layer, explains why (4) reaches 4.25 rounds and not further. Recal
that we use a 16th-order derivative, because it is a 4th-order attack and t = 4.
After the third S-box layer, the degree of the polynomial is 3, which vanishes for
a 16-th order derivative. The same happens after the fourth SB layer (the degree
becomes 9), but not after the fifth SB layer (the degree becomes 27). That is
why this distinguisher cannot reach beyond 4.25 rounds.


A∗ P P P
P A∗ P P
P P A∗ P
P P P A∗

 =


E1 P P P
P E2 P P
P P E3 P
P P P E4


SR◦SB◦AK0→


A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P


SR◦SB◦AK1◦MC→


A∗ P P P
P P P A∗
P P A∗ P
P A∗ P P


MC
→


E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 E2 E3 E4


SR◦SB◦AK2→


E1 E2 E3 E4
E2 E3 E4 E1
E3 E4 E1 E2
E4 E1 E2 E3

 =


A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4


SR◦SB◦AK3◦MC→


A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4 A
∗
1
A∗3 A
∗
4 A
∗
1 A
∗
2
A∗4 A
∗
1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3


AK4◦MC→


B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B


SB
→


? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

 (4)
Unlike (2), the distinguisher (4) is one round longer. An exception is the case
t = 3 which is depicted in (5).
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

A∗ P P P
P A∗ P P
P P A∗ P
P P P A∗

 =


E1 P P P
P E2 P P
P P E3 P
P P P E4


SR◦SB◦AK0→


A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P


SR◦SB◦AK1◦MC→


A∗ P P P
P P P A∗
P P A∗ P
P A∗ P P


MC
→


A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4


SR◦SB◦AK2→


A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4 A
∗
1
A∗3 A
∗
4 A
∗
1 A
∗
2
A∗4 A
∗
1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3


MC
→


A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗


SR◦SB◦AK3→


A1 A2 A3 A4
A2 A3 A4 A1
A3 A4 A1 A2
A4 A1 A2 A3


SB◦AK4◦MC→


E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 E2 E3 E4


SR
→


E1 E2 E3 E4
E2 E3 E4 E1
E3 E4 E1 E2
E4 E1 E2 E3


AK5◦MC→


B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B


SB
→


? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

 (5)
For (5), the argument of higher-order derivatives matches exactly the lengths
obtained experimentally. At the third round, the Boolean expressions of the S-
boxes have degree 2, which vanish for an 12th-order derivative (4th-order order
Λ-set). After the fourth S-box layer, the degree reaches 4; after the fifth SB layer,
the degree becomes 8. In all and these cases the polynomials vanish. But, for the
sixth SB layer, the degree becomes 16 which larger than 12. Thus, (5) reaches
only 5.25 rounds.
An 8th-order square distinguisher for t = 4 is depicted in (6).


A∗ A∗ P P
P A∗ A∗ P
P P A∗ A∗
A∗ P P A∗

 =


E1 E2 P P
P E3 E4 P
P P E5 E6
E8 P P E7


SR◦SB◦AK0→


A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ A∗ P P


SR◦SB◦AK1◦MC→


A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ P P A∗
P P A∗ A∗
P A∗ A∗ P


SB◦AK2◦MC→


E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4


SR
→


E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4 E
∗
1
E∗3 E
∗
4 E
∗
1 E
∗
2
E∗4 E
∗
1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3


SR◦SB◦AK3◦MC→


E E E E
E E E E
E E E E
E E E E


AK4◦MC→


B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B


SB
→


? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

 (6)
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An 8th-order distinguisher for t = 3 is depicted in (7) and covers 6.25 rounds.


A∗ A∗ P P
P A∗ A∗ P
P P A∗ A∗
A∗ P P A∗


SR◦SB◦AK0→


A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ A∗ P P


SR◦SB◦AK1◦MC→


A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ P P A∗
P P A∗ A∗
P A∗ A∗ P


SB◦AK2◦MC→


E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4


SR
→


E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4 E
∗
1
E∗3 E
∗
4 E
∗
1 E
∗
2
E∗4 E
∗
1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3


SR◦SB◦AK3◦MC→


A1 A1 A2 A2
A1 A2 A2 A1
A2 A2 A1 A1
A2 A1 A1 A2


SR◦SB◦AK5◦MC◦SR◦SB◦AK4◦MC→


E E E E
E E E E
E E E E
E E E E


AK6◦MC→


B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B


SB
→


? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

 (7)
Finally, the longer square distinguisher we ever found is depicted in (8). It is
a 12th-order square distinguisher for t = 3 and covers 7.25 rounds.


A∗ A∗ A∗ P
P A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ P A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ P A∗


SR◦SB◦AK0→


A∗ A∗ A∗ P
A∗ A∗ A∗ P
A∗ A∗ A∗ P
A∗ A∗ A∗ P


SR◦SB◦AK1◦MC→


A∗ A∗ A∗ P
A∗ A∗ P A∗
A∗ P A∗ A∗
P A∗ A∗ A∗


SB◦AK2◦MC→


E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4


SR
→


E∗1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4
E∗2 E
∗
3 E
∗
4 E
∗
1
E∗3 E
∗
4 E
∗
1 E
∗
2
E∗4 E
∗
1 E
∗
2 E
∗
3


SB◦AK3◦MC→


A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4
A∗1 A
∗
2 A
∗
3 A
∗
4


SR◦SB◦AK5◦MC◦SR◦SB◦AK4◦MC◦SR→


E E E E
E E E E
E E E E
E E E E


AK7◦MC◦SR◦SB◦AK6◦MC→


B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B


SB
→


? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

 (8)
7 Summary and Open Problems
Table 2 presents a summary of the square distinguishers for mini-AES versions
and AES itself. The figures with ’*’ indicate the predicted length of distinguishers
based on higher-order derivatives.
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Table 2. Number of rounds of square distinguishers for t-bit word AES (*: predicted).
t (bits) Λ-set Order
1 4 8 12
3 3.25 5.25 6.25 7.25
4 3.25 4.25 5.25 5.25*
5 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.25*
6 3.25 4.25 4.25* 4.25*
7 3.25 4.25 4.25* 4.25*
8 3.25 4.25 4.25* 4.25*
From Table 2, we conclude that the higher-order square attack (beyond the
4th order) is not effective against AES. Moreover, the square distinguishers seems
to behave differently for mini-versions and for the original AES. This asymmetry
is due to the decreasing nonlinear degree in the scaled-down S-boxes.
The conclusions for AES cannot be immediately extended to Rijndael with
blocks larger than 128 bits because the state matrix of the latter is 4× n, with
n > 4 and thus, diffusion is not as uniform as in AES. Experiments indicate that
the size of distinguishers is larger than predicted by higher-order derivatives due
to non-uniform diffusion because of the ad hoc ShiftRows offsets. Moreover, some
bytes of the distinguisher may still retain some balanced bytes, while in AES,
not residual balanced bytes remained.
An interesting open problem is to apply the higher-order derivative approach
to general SPN schemes such as SASAS and SASASAS [2], in which the S-boxes
(and linear components) are key-dependent, but may have (potentially) small
nonlinear degree.
It is an open problem whether other tecniques can be combined with square
attacks to exploit further rounds of word-oriented ciphers. For example, in the
cases where the degree of the Boolean multivariate expressions do not vanish,
there is a residual degree that may still be small enough for cube attacks [8]. For
example, the degree of the Boolean expression at the end of (5) in a 4th-order
Λ-set is only 16− 12 = 4.
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A Mini-AES S-boxes
The S-boxes used in our experiments are listed below for word sizes t ∈ {3, 4,
5, 6, 7}. The S-box entries are listed in sequential order with the leftmost entry
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corresponding to S[0], and the rightmost entry to S[2t− 1]. In order to keep the
designs as similar as possible to the original AES, the S-boxes are permutations
designed as the composition of the inversion mapping in GF(2t) followed by an
affine transformation.
For t = 3: S = [7, 2, 5, 1, 0, 6, 4, 3].
For t = 4: S = [13, 10, 1, 5, 12, 15, 9, 14, 2, 3, 11, 7, 8, 0, 4, 6].
For t = 5: S = [17, 14, 31, 29, 16, 21, 19, 3, 6, 26, 23, 28, 18, 15, 10, 13, 27, 24,
1, 7, 20, 0, 4, 30, 5, 9, 8, 12, 25, 22, 11, 2].
For t = 6: S = [49, 14, 7, 45, 28, 5, 27, 61, 60, 53, 47, 15, 54, 3, 19, 48, 12, 63, 23,
2, 40, 36, 24, 39, 59, 33, 58, 13, 50, 35, 46, 11, 52, 31, 32, 17, 20, 56, 37, 42, 34,
38, 0, 1, 26, 8, 44, 16, 6, 4, 57, 30, 25, 41, 43, 18, 29, 22, 10, 9, 55, 21, 62, 51].
For t = 7: S = [49, 78, 127, 61, 64, 8, 115, 109, 110, 5, 74, 58, 2, 6, 27, 7, 111,
102, 47, 120, 121, 117, 1, 56, 93, 112, 91, 96, 54, 17, 124, 94, 72, 77, 43, 59, 40,
12, 50, 81, 21, 29, 87, 18, 41, 98, 82, 92, 3, 32, 118, 37, 86, 106, 126, 88, 67, 23,
33, 95, 52, 97, 119, 13, 42, 24, 11, 68, 46, 55, 38, 60, 90, 123, 76, 22, 69, 19, 65,
25, 39, 71, 99, 31, 20, 0, 85, 14, 125, 10, 45, 48, 53, 108, 36, 28, 122, 73, 30, 101,
35, 79, 63, 114, 51, 44, 105, 83, 103, 113, 34, 70, 26, 75, 116, 84, 57, 15, 80, 100,
16, 62, 89, 104, 4, 9, 107, 66].
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